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Abstract  The  goal  of  this  study  is  to  analyze  the  incidence  of  dominant  owners  in  the  probabi-
lity of  the  presence  of  political  directors  and  the  effect  of  said  presence  on  ﬁrm  value.  The  study
uses a  sample  of  non-ﬁnancial  Spanish  companies  listed  on  the  Spanish  Stock  Exchange  over  the
period 2003--2012.  The  results  show  that  around  half  of  the  ﬁrms  have  at  least  one  ex-politician
on their  board  of  directors.  Furthermore,  the  results  indicate  that  dominant  shareholders’
voting rights  and  family  nature  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  having  ex-politicians
on the  board  of  directors.  Moreover,  the  results  show  that  the  presence  of  political  connections
positively affects  ﬁrm  value.  Further  analyses  show  that  this  relationship  is  dependent  upon  the
nature of  the  dominant  owner,  the  use  of  pyramidal  structures,  the  tenure  of  board  membersBoard  of  directors and the  political  directors’  ownership  stake.
© 2013  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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pain,  like  most  countries  in  Continental  Europe,  is  in  the
rocess  of  changing  its  corporate  governance  system.  In
his  context,  institutions,  academics,  politicians  and  ﬁrms
ighlight  the  need  to  improve  corporate  governance  in
rder  to  limit  potential  conﬂicts  between  internal  agents  as
ominant  owners  and  managers  and  minority  shareholders.
t  the  same  time,  the  economic,  ﬁnancial  and  institu-∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 928 45 81 69;
ax: +34 928 45 81 77.
E-mail address: jsantana@defc.ulpgc.es (D.J. Santana Martín).
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ional  crises  affecting  Europe  since  mid-2007,  particularly  in
ountries  such  as  Greece,  Italy,  Ireland,  Portugal  and  Spain,
as  led  to  an  increased  interest  in  the  study  of  political  and
usiness  ties  and  their  effect  on  ﬁrm  behaviour.  The  Span-
sh  business  environment  is  characterized  by  a  high  level  of
orruption.  According  to  the  Corruption  Perceptions  Index
013  (Transparency  International),  Spain  and  Italy  are  two
f  the  largest  European  countries  with  the  highest  levels  of
orruption.  Moreover,  according  to  the  Global  Competitive-
ess  Report  2013--2014  (World  Economic  Forum),  out  of  the
48  countries  surveyed,  Spain  ranks  101st  in  terms  of  citi-
en  trust  in  politicians,  93rd  in  terms  of  board  of  directors
ffectiveness  and  138th  in  terms  of  ease  of  access  to  bank
oans.
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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The  low  transparency  associated  with  the  links  between
corporate  and  political  elites,  as  well  as  the  absence  of
previous  empirical  evidence  on  the  presence  of  political
connections  in  the  Spanish  context,  shows  that  the  level  of
knowledge  about  this  phenomenon  does  not  exceed  the  level
of  anecdotal  evidence  and  the  number  of  cases  with  signiﬁ-
cant  media  coverage,  such  as  the  appointment  of  ex-Spanish
president  Don  Felipe  González  Márquez  as  director  of  Gas
natural,  S.A.  in  2010  or  the  hiring  of  the  ex-Spanish  presi-
dent  Don  José  María  Aznar  López  as  an  external  consultant
for  Endesa  in  2011.
The  studies  focusing  on  political  connections  face  two
important  challenges.  First,  the  links  between  corporate
and  political  elites  are  often  characterized  by  their  opac-
ity  to  facilitate  political  rent-seeking,  especially  those  rents
of  dubious  legality  (Leuz  and  Oberholzer-Gee,  2006).  Thus,
the  connections  between  politicians  and  entrepreneurs  can
be  made  using  private  channels  that  remove  the  company
from  the  scrutiny  faced  by  politically  connected  ﬁrms  (e.g.,
Riahi-Belkaoui,  2004;  Chaney  et  al.,  2011;  Boubakri  et  al.,
2012).  Second,  the  analysis  of  explicit  political  connec-
tions  in  a  ﬁrm  faces  the  difﬁculty  arising  from  the  absence
of  a  generally  accepted  deﬁnition  of  political  connection.
This  makes  it  difﬁcult  to  empirically  study  the  relation-
ship  between  political  ties  and  corporate  behaviour  (Chen
et  al.,  2011).  A  ﬁrm’s  political  ties  can  be  the  result  of
politicians  moving  from  the  political  arena  to  the  business
environment  (revolving  door)  or  vice  versa  (reverse  revolv-
ing  door).  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  revolving  door  cases.
More  speciﬁcally,  following  earlier  literature  (e.g., Faccio,
2006;  Goldman  et  al.,  2009;  Chaney  et  al.,  2011;  Chen  et  al.,
2011;  Boubakri  et  al.,  2012;  Duchin  and  Sosyura,  2012),  we
consider  the  presence  of  politicians  on  a  ﬁrm’s  board  of
directors  as  a  proxy  for  the  existence  of  political  connec-
tions.
Previous  studies  have  found  several  motivations  for  the
existence  of  politically  connected  ﬁrms.  Thus,  Khwaja  and
Mian  (2005)  argue  that  politically  connected  ﬁrms  enjoy
increased  access  to  capital  from  ﬁnancial  institutions,  and
Boubakri  et  al.  (2012)  show  that  these  ﬁrms  have  less  bud-
get  constraints  and  are  less  sensitive  to  competitor  pressure
than  ﬁrms  without  political  connections.  Moreover,  Qian
et  al.  (2011)  ﬁnd  that  dominant  shareholders’  tunnelling
and  self-dealing  activities  are  more  pronounced  in  politically
connected  ﬁrms  when  the  goal  of  the  connection  is  to  ensure
access  to  bank  ﬁnancing.  Chen  et  al.  (2011)  ﬁnd  that  polit-
ically  connected  ﬁrms  increase  information  asymmetries,
and  Chaney  et  al.  (2011)  and  Bona  et  al.  (2014)  show  a  lower
quality  of  accounting  information  in  politically  connected
ﬁrms.  Additionally,  political  directors  could  be  an  important
source  of  beneﬁts  for  the  company  because  they  provide
knowledge  on  bureaucratic  and  regulatory  procedures  (e.g.,
Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  2001;  Goldman  et  al.,  2009).  Faccio
(2006)  notes  that  political  connections  favour  preferential
treatment  for  companies  in  terms  of  tax  beneﬁts,  award  of
government  contracts,  less  regulatory  control  over  the  com-
pany  or  greater  control  over  rivals.  Thereby,  considering  the
above  arguments  and  the  ﬁndings  of  Agrawal  and  Knoeber
(2001),  politicians  on  the  board  play  a  ‘‘political  role’’,  i.e.,
they  primarily  serve  as  an  instrument  to  promote  the  sys-
tematic  exchange  of  favours  between  political  and  business
elites  (Chaney  et  al.,  2011).
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In  Continental  Europe,  the  presence  of  dominant  share-
olders  in  large  public  companies  is  extensive  (e.g., La  Porta
t  al.,  1999;  Faccio  and  Lang,  2002).  These  owners  shape
he  business  elite  and,  therefore,  may  possess  high  politi-
al  and  economic  inﬂuence  (e.g., Morck  and  Yeung,  2004;
orck  et  al.,  2004).  In  this  context,  dominant  owners  have
he  ability  and  incentive  to  play  an  active  role  in  designing
he  corporate  governance  system  (e.g.,  Shleifer  and  Vishny,
997;  La  Porta  et  al.,  1999,  2000;  Cuervo,  2002;  Burkart
t  al.,  2003;  Villalonga  and  Amit,  2006).  This  is  particularly
rue  of  boards  of  directors  because  dominant  owners  have
he  power  to  inﬂuence  board  composition,  deﬁning  the  dif-
erent  roles  that  encompass  this  internal  governance  device
e.g., Yeh  and  Woidtke,  2005;  Durnev  and  Kim,  2005;  Kim
t  al.,  2007;  Dahya  et  al.,  2008).
As  such,  the  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  analyze  the  relation-
hip  between  the  presence  of  political  directors  on  the  board
nd  dominant  owners’  effective  control,  as  well  as  to  study
he  effect  of  political  connections  on  ﬁrm  value.  For  this  pur-
ose,  we  used  a sample  of  non-ﬁnancial  Spanish  ﬁrms  listed
n  the  Spanish  Stock  Exchange  over  the  period  2003--2012.
oreover,  we  used  the  control  chain  methodology  to
dentify  the  dominant  owner  for  each  ﬁrm  and  determine  if
aid  owner  exercises  effective  control  through  a pyramidal
tructure  (e.g., La  Porta  et  al.,  1999;  Claessens  et  al.,  2000;
accio  and  Lang,  2002;  Santana  and  Aguiar,  2006;  Sacristán
nd  Gómez,  2007;  Pindado  et  al.,  2012).  The  study  of  board
omposition  and  ownership  structure  is  conducted  for  each
ear  and  ﬁrm  in  the  sample  to  reduce  problems  associated
ith  the  assumption  that  the  ownership  structure  remains
table  over  the  entire  sample  period.  Another  feature  of
his  study  is  that  the  unit  of  analysis  is  the  company  and
ot  the  country,  thereby  reducing  the  problems  related  to
nternational  studies  of  corporate  governance  that  address
ifferent  legal,  regulatory  and  institutional  frameworks,
hich  make  it  complicated  to  distinguish  ﬁrm-level  effects
n  the  results  achieved  from  country-level  effects  (King
nd  Santor,  2008).  In  this  line,  Faccio  (2010)  argues  that
he  costs  and  beneﬁts  of  political  connections  depend  on
he  speciﬁc  characteristics  of  each  country.
The  results  of  this  study  reveal  that  around  half  of  listed
panish  companies  have  at  least  one  ex-politician  on  its
oard  of  directors.  Furthermore,  the  results  indicate  that
oth  the  dominant  owner’s  voting  rights  and  his/her  family
ature  affect  the  likelihood  that  an  ex-politician  might  be
ppointed  as  director.  Moreover,  the  results  show  that  the
resence  of  a  politically  connected  board  positively  affects
rm  value.  Further  analysis  shows  that  this  incidence  is
ependent  upon  the  nature  of  the  dominant  owner,  the  use
f  pyramidal  structures,  the  political  director’s  tenure  and
is/her  ownership  stake.
Our  study  contributes  to  the  literature  on  the  effect  of
olitical  ties  and  board  composition  in  three  ways.  First,
o  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  ﬁrst  study  that
ocuses  on  the  presence  of  political  directors  over  a  large
ime  period  (ten  years)  in  a  country  in  Continental  Europe.
econd,  it  is  the  ﬁrst  work  that  analyses  the  relationship
etween  the  power  of  dominant  owners  and  the  presence
f  politicians  on  the  board  of  directors  in  a country  without
 planned  economy.  In  this  sense,  the  study  shows  the  power
f  the  dominant  owners  in  determining  the  composition  of
he  board  of  directors  and  deﬁning  the  different  roles  played
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y  the  appointed  directors.  The  results  are  particularly
elevant  for  increasing  the  knowledge  of  factors  that  deter-
ine  the  composition  of  the  board  in  environments  with
oncentrated  ownership.  In  this  line,  Hermalin  and  Weisbach
1988)  argue  that  to  understand  how  board  members  are
lected  it  is  crucial  to  understand  the  role  that  the  board
lays  in  the  whole  system  of  corporate  governance.  Third,
ost  studies  on  the  impact  of  political  connections  on  ﬁrm
alue  have  focused  on  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  or  on  the
sian  environment  using  an  event  methodology  and  small
amples;  therefore,  their  results  are  hardly  generalizable
Cooper  et  al.,  2010).
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In
ection  ‘‘Theoretical  arguments’’,  we  develop  our  hypothe-
es  on  the  relationship  between  ﬁrms’  political  connections
nd  dominant  owners.  In  section  ‘‘Research  design’’,  we
escribe  our  research  design,  and  in  section  ‘‘Results’’  we
resent  our  empirical  results.  Finally,  in  the  last  section,  we
rovide  a  summary  and  conclusion.
heoretical arguments
olitical  connections  and  dominant  owners
he  previous  literature  does  not  provide  conclusive  results
egarding  the  characteristics  of  a  country  that  favours  links
etween  politicians  and  businesses.  Thus,  authors  such  as
accio  (2006)  and  Chen  et  al.  (2011)  argue  that  political
onnections  are  stronger  and  more  common  in  countries
ith  weak  legal  systems  and  high  levels  of  corruption.  How-
ver,  political  connectivity  is  also  relevant  in  democratic
overnments  because  the  greater  transparency  of  political
onnections  facilitates  the  detection  of  undesirable  acts  and
he  implementation  of  sanctions.  Morck  et  al.  (2000)  show
 large  number  of  political  connections  in  Canadian  compa-
ies,  and  Goldman  et  al.  (2009)  and  Cooper  et  al.  (2010)
emonstrate  the  high  political  connectivity  of  U.S.  compa-
ies.  Thereby,  business  elites  have  incentives  to  interact
ith  the  political  arena  in  order  to  affect  the  development
f  the  legal  framework  and  economic  development  con-
itioning  the  distribution  of  capital  and  investment  in  an
conomy  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1998).
The  presence  of  dominant  owners  facilitates  the
xchange  of  favours  with  political  elites,  as  the  concen-
ration  of  ownership  offers  the  necessary  stability  to
egotiate  favours  with  politicians.  On  the  contrary,  this
ontinuity  is  not  guaranteed  if  control  is  held  by  managers
r  shareholders  with  a  low  ownership  stake.  Thus,  Morck
t  al.  (2004)  argue  that  the  stability  provided  by  ownership
oncentration  facilitates  the  collusion  between  business
nd  political  elites.  For  these  authors,  the  existence  of
ominant  owners  allows  the  presence  of  an  oligarchic
apitalism  that  encourages  the  development  of  political
obbying  to  preserve  their  status  quo. Chen  et  al.  (2011)
rgue  that  ownership  concentration  provides  beneﬁts  to
he  relationship  between  ﬁrms  and  politicians.  Therefore,
wnership  concentration  increases  the  homogeneity  of
hareholder  interests  and  reduces  the  costs  of  carrying  out
ollective  actions  to  establish  and  maintain  connections
ith  the  political  elites,  assuring  that  the  beneﬁts  from
he  connection  established  by  the  dominant  owner  is
a
g
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ot  diluted  by  the  participation  of  other  shareholders.
inally,  the  concentration  of  ownership  reduces  the  need
o  transfer  information  on  political  rents  that  beneﬁt  both
ominant  owners  and  politicians,  as  both  have  interests  in
eeping  the  exchange  of  favours  hidden.  Consequently,  the
oncentration  of  ownership  in  the  hands  of  a  shareholder
ncreases  her/his  ability  to  set  up  private  channels  with
olitical  elites  because  politicians  and  entrepreneurs  have
ncentives  to  provide  opacity  to  their  relationships  (e.g.,
euz  and  Oberholzer-Gee,  2006;  Bona  et  al.,  2014).
Additionally,  previous  literature  indicates  that,  outside
he  Anglo-Saxon  environment,  dominant  owners  use  pyra-
id  structures  to  acquire  power  (e.g., La  Porta  et  al.,
999;  Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  Faccio  and  Lang,  2002).  These
tructures  allow  controlling  shareholders  to  retain  control
ith  relatively  low  levels  of  investment  (Cuervo,  2002).
n  addition,  pyramidal  structures  facilitate  the  stability  of
he  dominant  owner’s  control  because  these  devices  help
im/her  defend  his/her  position  (e.g., Amoako-Adu  and
mith,  2001;  Daines  and  Klausner,  2001;  Santana  et  al.,
009).  Therefore,  pyramids  reduce  transaction  costs  in
eveloping  lobbying  policies  (Morck  et  al.,  2004).  Khanna
nd  Palepu  (2000)  argue  that  pyramidal  structures  allow  for
he  coordination  of  favours  and  trust  and  enable  economies
f  scale  through  the  use  of  reputation  in  the  relationship
etween  corporate  and  political  elites.  This  may  be  of  par-
icular  interest  when  the  capital  markets  are  less  developed
nd  trust  relationships  are  needed  to  complete  contracts.
However,  the  stability  in  a  company’s  power  is  not  solely
etermined  by  the  ownership  stake  or  control  through  a
yramidal  group.  In  this  sense,  the  nature  of  the  dominant
wner  may  inﬂuence  the  relevance  attached  to  stability  in
ontrol.  Anderson  and  Reeb  (2003)  argue  that  family  owners
end  to  maintain  long-term  control  of  a  company  as  a  large
art  of  their  family  wealth  is  linked  to  company  wealth.
onsequently,  as  a result  of  their  position,  family  elites  may
btain  non-pecuniary  beneﬁts  from  political  ties.  In  addi-
ion  to  political  rents,  family  elites  can  also  obtain  political
nﬂuence,  social  status  or  a  higher  degree  of  impunity  in  the
bsence  of  legal  compliance  (Morck,  2009).
Nevertheless,  in  Continental  Europe  and  particularly  in
pain,  family  owners  are  not  the  only  dominant  owners
hat  have  traditionally  been  part  of  the  ‘‘oligarchy’’  of
ontrolling  shareholders.  Families  have  shared  this  role
ith  banks,  which  have  participated  signiﬁcantly  in  the
wnership  of  listed  Spanish  ﬁrms  and  have  played  an  active
ole  in  corporate  governance  (Ruiz  and  Santana,  2011).  In
his  environment,  banks  have  had  a  signiﬁcant  inﬂuence
n  Spanish  economic  development  and  the  way  of  doing
usiness  (e.g., Cuervo,  1991;  Steinherr  and  Huveneers,
994;  Zoido,  1998;  Fernández,  2001).  Beck  et  al.  (2000)
rgue  that  ﬁnancial  intermediaries  modify  the  evolu-
ion  of  economic  growth  because  they  can  inﬂuence  the
istribution  of  ﬁnancing  as  well  as  technological  change
nd  productivity  growth.  Consequently,  in  Europe,  the
ominance  of  a  few  large  banks  facilitates  the  formation  of
oalitions  and  stronger  relationships  between  the  state  and
he  banking  system  (Rajan  and  Zingales,  2003).In  this  context,  the  dominant  owners  have  the  ability
nd  the  incentives  to  inﬂuence  the  design  of  the  corporate
overnance  system,  particularly  regarding  the  composition
f  the  board  and  the  different  roles  of  board  members  (e.g.,
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Yeh  and  Woidtke,  2005;  Durnev  and  Kim,  2005;  Kim  et  al.,
2007;  Dahya  et  al.,  2008).  Thus,  board  structure  is  shaped  by
the  costs  and  beneﬁts  derived  from  company  control  and  the
directors’  ability  to  advise  internal  agents  (Li  et  al.,  2008).
In  this  sense,  when  the  dominant  owner  stably  controls  a
signiﬁcant  capital  stake,  he/she  will  be  more  likely  to  use
private  channels  with  political  elites  because  the  dominant
owner  will  beneﬁt  less  from  having  a  political  director  on
the  board  as  it  increases  scrutiny  over  company  perfor-
mance  (e.g., Riahi-Belkaoui,  2004;  Chaney  et  al.,  2011;
Boubakri  et  al.,  2012).  Therefore,  it  is  expected  that  the
relationship  between  the  dominant  owner’s  control  and
the  presence  of  a  politically  connected  board  would  be
negative.  Therefore,  our  ﬁrst  hypothesis  is  as  follows:
Hypothesis  1.  Control  in  the  hands  of  the  dominant  share-
holder  has  a  negative  inﬂuence  on  the  probability  of  having
a  politically  connected  board.
Political  connections  and  ﬁrm  value
Previous  literature  suggests  several  motivations  for
the  existence  of  political  connections,  including  access  to
privileged  ﬁnancing  sources,  subsidies  or  the  use  of  contacts
and  knowledge  to  obtain  favours  when  developing  new
regulations  or  participating  in  contracts  with  government
authorities  (e.g.,  Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  2001;  Goldman
et  al.,  2009).  Moreover,  Faccio  (2006)  argues  that  political
ties  can  lead  to  preferential  government  treatment  through,
for  instance,  increased  access  to  bank  ﬁnancing,  lower  tax
rates,  more  government  contract  awards  and  less  regulatory
oversight  of  the  connected  ﬁrm  or  greater  oversight  of
the  connected  ﬁrm’s  rivals.  Boubakri  et  al.  (2012)  show
that  these  ﬁrms  have  fewer  budget  constraints  and  are
less  sensitive  to  competition  pressure  than  ﬁrms  without
political  connections.  Duchin  and  Sosyura  (2012)  show  that
politically  connected  ﬁrms  receive  more  public  investment.
Therefore,  maintaining  a  relationship  with  the  political
elite  over  time  is  a  strategy  that  can  generate  value  for
a  company.  Fisman  (2001)  shows  that  the  market  value
of  Indonesian  ﬁrms  closely  related  to  President  Suharto’s
family  experienced  a  signiﬁcant  decrease  upon  the  release
of  negative  news  about  the  president’s  health.  Similarly,
Faccio  and  Parsley  (2009)  ﬁnd  a  signiﬁcant  decrease  in  ﬁrm
value  after  the  death  of  politicians  residing  or  born  in  the
same  geographic  area  as  the  head  company.  In  addition,
Goldman  et  al.  (2009)  show  that  corporate  donations  are
a  less  reliable  indicator  of  future  performance  that  the
presence  of  political  directors  on  the  board.
Moreover,  an  environment  of  ownership  concentration
and  a  weak  legal  system  increases  the  importance  of  per-
sonal  networks  and  reputation  as  valuable  instruments  for
attenuating  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders’  wealth
by  the  dominant  shareholders  (e.g.,  Agrawal  and  Knoeber,
2001;  Stafsudd,  2009).  In  this  sense,  politically  connected
ﬁrms  may  be  subject  to  greater  scrutiny  by  ﬁnancial  ana-
lysts  and  the  media  (e.g., Riahi-Belkaoui,  2004;  Chaney
et  al.,  2011;  Boubakri  et  al.,  2012).  This  scrutiny  can  lead  to
greater  alignment  between  controlling  and  minority  share-
holders’  interests  because  of  the  greater  importance  that
stability  in  control  and  reputation  acquire  in  this  scenario.
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However,  political  connections  can  be  established  to
chieve  goals  other  than  value  generation,  especially
n  environments  where  shareholders  are  not  sufﬁciently
rotected  by  the  legal  system  and  dominant  owners  can
eneﬁt  from  political  rent-seeking.  Therefore,  Morck  et  al.
2004)  consider  the  presence  of  an  ‘‘oligarchic  capitalism’’
n  concentrated  ownership  environments  as  an  incentive
or  political  and  business  elites  to  preserve  the  status  quo
t  the  expense  of  other  stakeholders’  interests.
Qian  et  al.  (2011)  suggest  that  political  connections  can
hape  dominant  owners’  incentive  to  expropriate  minority
hareholders  because  these  connections  limit  capital  mar-
et  discipline.  Consequently,  as  these  authors  indicate,  the
ossibility  of  obtaining  funds  outside  the  ﬁnancial  market
an  provide  greater  incentives  to  carry  out  expropriation
ctivities.  Therefore,  Qian  et  al.  (2011)  found  that  dominant
wners’  tunnelling  and  self-dealing  activities  are  more  pro-
ounced  in  ﬁrms  where  political  connection  aims  to  secure
ank  loan  access.  For  these  authors,  dominant  owners’
xpropriation  activities  face  a possible  trade-off  between
hort-term  beneﬁts  and  long-term  costs  arising  from  the  loss
f  corporate  reputation.  In  this  context,  this  cost  depends  on
uture  investment  opportunities  and  the  ﬁnancial  resources
vailable  to  fund  them.  Accordingly,  when  political  connec-
ions  are  established  to  ensure  access  to  ﬁnancing  sources
utside  of  the  capital  markets,  dominant  owners  are  less
oncerned  about  the  loss  of  reputation  and  will  have  a
reater  incentive  to  obtain  private  beneﬁts.
Therefore,  the  above  arguments  highlight  the  importance
f  considering  the  environment  in  which  political  connec-
ions  are  established  because  the  environment  could  affect
ot  only  the  purpose  of  such  connections  but  also  their
osts  and  beneﬁts.  Faccio  (2010)  shows  that  the  differences
etween  connected  and  unconnected  ﬁrms  are  greater  in
nstitutional  environments  characterized  by  weak  protec-
ion  of  external  shareholders  and  that  the  costs  and  beneﬁts
f  political  connections  depend  on  the  particular  character-
stics  of  the  institutional  environment.  Consequently,  the
bove  arguments  predict  opposite  effects  regarding  the
elationship  between  political  connections  and  ﬁrm  value.
herefore,  our  second  hypothesis  is
ypothesis  2.  Political  connections  will  affect  the  ﬁrm
alue.
ypothesis  2a.  Political  connections  have  a  positive  effect
n  the  ﬁrm  value.
ypothesis  2b.  Political  connections  have  a  negative
ffect  on  the  ﬁrm  value.
esearch design
ample
he  initial  sample  comprises  115  non-ﬁnancial  ﬁrms  listed
n  the  Spanish  Stock  Exchange  between  2003  and  2012.  In
ur  regression  analysis,  we  apply  the  method  developed  by
adi  (1994)  to  eliminate  outliers.  As  a  result,  we  obtain  an
nbalanced  panel  of  999  ﬁrm-year  observations,  with  95%  of
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he  ﬁrms  having  six  or  more  observations  over  the  2003  to
012  period.
ata
e  hand-collect  data  on  board  composition  and  ownership
tructure,  as  well  as  additional  information  on  the  economic
haracteristics  of  the  companies  analyzed,  for  each  year
f  the  analyzed  period.  Thus,  we  have  obtained  the  ﬁnan-
ial  data  from  the  ﬁnancial  information  of  listed  companies
ublished  by  the  Spanish  Securities  Exchange  Commission
CNMV).  We  examine  the  Curriculum  Vitae  of  the  board
embers  from  the  Annual  Corporate  Governance  Reports
ublished  by  the  Spanish  Security  Exchange  Commission  and
rom  the  ﬁrms’  websites.  When  this  information  was  not
vailable,  we  asked  the  ﬁrms  directly.
Finally,  consistent  with  previous  research  focused  on  the
panish  business  environment  (e.g., Santana  and  Aguiar,
006;  Sacristán  and  Gómez,  2007;  Ruiz  and  Santana,  2009,
011),  variables  related  to  the  level  of  voting  rights,  the
ature  of  the  dominant  owners  and  the  use  of  pyramidal
tructures  have  been  obtained  by  using  the  control  chain
ethodology  to  identify  the  dominant  owner  of  the  com-
any,  measure  her/his  voting  and  cash  ﬂows  rights  and
dentify  the  global  structure  through  which  that  owner
ontrols  the  company  (e.g., La  Porta  et  al.,  1999;  Claessens
t  al.,  2000;  Faccio  and  Lang,  2002;  Santana  and  Aguiar,
006;  Sacristán  and  Gómez,  2007;  Pindado  et  al.,  2012).
onsequently,  a  ﬁrm  has  a  dominant  owner  if  the  main
hareholder  directly  or  indirectly  holds  a  percentage  of
oting  rights  equal  to  or  above  an  established  level  of
ontrol,  which,  consistent  with  previous  literature,  is  20%.
herefore,  the  identiﬁcation  of  a  family  or  a  bank  as
he  dominant  owner  through  the  use  of  this  methodology
revents  mistakes  that  are  prevalent  in  concentrated
wnership  environments,  such  as  assigning  a  shareholder  a
evel  of  voting  and  cash  ﬂow  rights  that  does  not  correspond
ith  his/her  real  holding.  Moreover,  this  methodology
revents  the  researcher  from  identifying  a  shareholder  as
 dominant  owner  when  he/she  does  not  actually  occupy
he  ﬁnal  position  in  the  control  chain.  To  identify  such
wnership--control  relationships,  we  hand-collect  owner-
hip  data  to  allow  us  to  identify  a  ﬁrm’s  entire  ownership
ontrol  chain  for  each  sample  year.  We  start  with  informa-
ion  on  signiﬁcant  shareholdings  published  by  the  Spanish
ecurities  Exchange  Commission,  which  includes  data  on  the
irect  and  indirect  participation  of  shareholders  that  own  at
east  5%  of  a  ﬁrm’s  shares,  as  well  as  ownership  in  the  hands
f  the  board,  regardless  of  the  size  of  the  holding.  Next,  we
omplement  these  data  with  the  Amadeus  database  (Bureau
an  Dijk),  which  publishes  information  on  board  of  directors
nd  ownership  structure  for  Spanish  listed  and  non-listed
rms.  For  those  cases  in  which  a  non-Spanish  holds  shares  of
 Spanish  ﬁrm,  we  complete  our  mapping  of  the  ownership
tructure  by  examining  the  ﬁrms’  annual  reports  published
nline  and  resolving  any  remaining  question  vía  email.ariables
o  analyze  the  likelihood  that  a  ﬁrm  is  politically  connected,
e  deﬁne  POLITICIANS  as  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the
o
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alue  of  one  if  at  least  one  of  the  members  of  the  board
f  directors  has  held  a  political  position  at  the  European,
panish,  regional  or  local  level  in  the  past;  otherwise,  the
alue  is  zero.  This  approach  is  consistent  with  previous
iterature  (e.g., Faccio,  2006;  Goldman  et  al.,  2009;  Chaney
t  al.,  2011;  Boubakri  et  al.,  2012;  Duchin  and  Sosyura,
012;  Bona  et  al.,  2014).  As  an  example,  we  classify  the  ﬁrm
as  Natural  as  a  politically  connected  ﬁrm  in  2012  because
t  least  one  of  the  board  members  had  previously  held  a
eadership  position  in  politics.  Namely,  Mr.  Felipe  González
árquez  was  the  President  of  the  Spanish  Government  from
982  to  1994.  Another  politically  connected  ﬁrm  is  Vueling,
s  board  member  Mr.  Josep  Piqué  Camps  held  several
olitical  positions  in  the  Spanish  government  from  1996  to
003.  Thus,  as  in  the  previous  work,  this  study  focuses  on
evolving  door  cases,  identifying  politicians  who  enter  the
rivate  sector  as  director  of  a  listed  company.
The  study  of  the  effect  of  political  connections  on  ﬁrm
alue  has  been  accomplished  by  using  a measure  that
eﬂects  investor  expectations  about  the  ability  of  the  com-
any  to  produce  future  earnings.  Thus,  we  deﬁne  Q.TOBIN  as
he  ratio  of  the  market  value  of  the  ﬁrm  to  the  book  value  of
ts  assets  (e.g., Morck  et  al.,  1988;  McConnell  and  Servaes,
990;  Cho,  1998;  Demsetz  and  Villalonga,  2001;  López  and
odríguez,  2001;  Claessens  et  al.,  2002;  Seifert  et  al.,  2005;
illalonga  and  Amit,  2006;  Ferreira  and  Matos,  2008;  Ruiz
nd  Santana,  2011).
Therefore,  in  relationship  to  the  effect  of  POLITICIANS  on
rm  value,  the  above  theoretical  arguments  show  potential
ositive  and  negative  impacts  on  the  political  connection-
alue  relationship  (e.g., Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  2001;  Fisman,
001;  Faccio,  2006;  Faccio  and  Parsley,  2009;  Stafsudd,
009).  Consequently,  the  theoretical  arguments  do  not  allow
s  to  expect  a  particular  sign  in  the  relationship  between
OLITICIANS  and  ﬁrm  value.
Moreover,  to  further  explore  this  relationship,  we  deﬁne
he  variables  POLITICIANS  Famy, POLITICIANS  Bank  and
OLITICIANS  Pyramid  as  dummy  variables  that  take  the
alue  of  1  if  at  least  one  of  the  board  members  has  held
 political  position  at  the  European,  Spanish,  regional  or
ocal  level  in  the  past  and  the  dominant  owner  is  a  family,
 bank  or  control  the  ﬁrm  through  a  pyramid,  respectively;
therwise,  the  value  is  zero.  We  deﬁne  the  variable  POLITI-
IANS  TENURE  as  a  measurement  of  the  average  tenure
f  political  directors  as  board  members  and  the  variable
OLITICIANS  OWN  as  a  measurement  of  the  percentage  of
oting  rights  held  by  political  directors.  The  effect  of  these
wo  variables  on  the  value  of  the  company  will  be  analyzed
n  linear  and  quadratic  terms  because  the  theoretical  argu-
ents  and  opposite  empirical  results  in  previous  literature
nvite  us  to  analyze  this  incidence  for  different  political
irectors’  tenures  and  ownership  stakes.
The  remaining  corporate  governance  variables  used  in
he  analysis  of  the  likelihood  that  a  company  decides  to
stablish  political  connections  are  detailed  below.  The  vari-
ble  VOTING  is  measured  as  voting  rights  in  the  hands  of
he  dominant  owner.  The  variables  FAMILY  and  BANK  are
ummy  variables  that  take  the  value  of  one  if  the  dominant
wner  is  a  family  or  a  bank,  respectively;  otherwise,  the
alue  is  zero.  The  effect  of  the  use  of  pyramidal  structures
n  the  probability  that  a  company  will  establish  a  political
onnection  is  tested  using  the  variable  PYRAMID,  a  dummy
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variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  when  dominant  owner  con-
trol  is  exercised  through  a  pyramidal  structure;  otherwise,
the  value  is  zero.  Based  on  the  theoretical  arguments  set  out
in  Hypothesis  1,  we  expect  the  effect  of  previous  variables
on  the  likelihood  of  having  a  politically  connected  board  to
be  negative.
To  control  for  the  effect  of  other  variables  that  could
potentially  affect  the  investigated  relationship,  we  include
SIZE, measured  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  total
assets.  Therefore,  consistent  with  the  previous  literature,
we  expect  ﬁrm  size  to  positively  affect  the  likelihood
of  establishing  a  political  connection  (e.g., Agrawal  and
Knoeber,  2001;  Faccio,  2006;  Faccio  et  al.,  2006;  Boubakri
et  al.,  2008;  Cooper  et  al.,  2010).  Moreover,  authors  such  as
Khwaja  and  Mian  (2005),  Boubakri  et  al.  (2012)  and  Cooper
et  al.  (2010)  show  that  politically  connected  ﬁrms  are  char-
acterized  by  the  use  of  a  higher  level  of  debt;  therefore,  we
include  the  variable  DEBT, measured  as  total  debt  divided
by  total  assets  as  a  control  variable.  Moreover,  Cooper  et  al.
(2010)  and  Chen  et  al.  (2011)  show  that  politically  connected
ﬁrms  are  characterized  by  higher  proﬁtability  and  greater
investment  opportunities.  For  this  reason,  we  include  the
effect  of  growth  opportunities  MTB, deﬁned  as  the  market
value  of  equity  divided  by  the  book  value  of  equity.  Additio-
nally,  to  control  for  the  effect  of  the  bargaining  power
of  the  president  of  the  board,  we  include  the  variable
PRESI DUAL  as  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1
if  the  president  of  the  board  has  an  executive  role  and  zero
otherwise.  Following  the  arguments  of  Chen  et  al.  (2011),
we  expect  this  duality  to  positively  affect  the  likelihood  of
having  a  politically  connected  board,  as  the  concentration
of  power  facilitates  negotiation  with  politicians  and  reduces
the  risks  derived  from  sharing  information  about  the  real
beneﬁts  of  the  political  connection.  Finally,  we  use  dummy
variables  to  control  the  possible  industry  and  time  effects
on  the  likelihood  that  a  ﬁrm  will  establish  a  political
connection.
Results
Descriptive  statistics
Table  1  shows  the  evolution  of  political  connections  in
Spanish  listed  companies  for  the  period  2003--2012.  Thus,
the  table  details  the  percentage  of  politically  connected
ﬁrms,  both  when  considering  ex-politicians  at  local,
regional,  national  and  European  levels  and  when  analysing
only  high-level  politicians,  i.e., those  who  have  held  pos-
itions  at  the  national  or  European  level.  The  results  show
that  around  half  of  the  listed  companies  have  at  least
one  director  who  has  held  a  political  position.  In  addition,
high-level  politicians  are  present  in  46%  of  the  compa-
nies  analyzed.  These  results  are  not  consistent  with  those
obtained  in  Faccio’s  study  (2006),  in  which  the  author  ﬁnds
that  only  1.5%  of  Spanish  companies  are  politically  con-
nected.  This  discrepancy  may  be  due  to  Faccio’s  data.  In
fact,  the  previous  author  uses  data  from  2001,  a  year  in
which  the  level  of  transparency  about  the  governance  prac-
tices  of  Spanish  listed  companies  was  limited.  In  addition,
Faccio  analyzed  the  composition  of  the  board  through  the
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orldscope  database,  which  only  reports  information  about
he  President,  Vice  President,  CEO  and  Secretary.
Regarding  the  typology  of  political  directors,  the  results
how  that  70%  are  independent  directors,  20%  represent
igniﬁcant  shareholders  and  only  10%  have  an  executive
ole  in  the  company.  Moreover,  Table  1  shows  that  politi-
al  directors  have,  on  average,  six  years  tenure,  showing
 growing  trend  for  this  variable.  Therefore,  the  average
enure  increases  from  5.63  years  in  2003  to  7.45  years  in
012.  These  results  reﬂect  the  stability  of  political  directors
n  the  companies  in  which  they  have  been  appointed.  More-
ver,  these  directors  hold,  on  average,  0.2%  of  the  voting
ights,  keeping  this  ownership  stake  stable  over  the  period
nalyzed.
Concerning  the  distribution  of  politically  connected  ﬁrms
ccording  to  industry,  the  results  show  a  greater  presence
f  political  connections  in  companies  belonging  to  regulated
ndustries.  However,  we  can  observe  that  the  differences
etween  regulated  ﬁrms  and  unregulated  sectors  are
ecreasing.  Thus,  if  we  analyze  the  sectorial  distribution  of
onnected  ﬁrms  according  to  the  classiﬁcation  used  by  the
adrid  Stock  Exchange,  we  note  that  100%  of  boards  in  the
il  and  Energy  Industry  are  politically  connected  in  the  last
hree  years  analyzed,  the  increase  in  politically  connected
oards  in  the  ‘‘Basic  Materials,  Industry  and  Construc-
ion’’  industries  being  relevant.  In  contrast,  Real  Estate
gencies  and  Consumer  Goods  sectors  are  less  politically
onnected.
Table  2  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables
sed  in  the  empirical  study.  Hence,  regarding  the  ownership
ariables,  the  results  reﬂect  a  32.08%  average  ownership
take  in  the  hands  of  the  dominant  owner.  Moreover,  48.43%
f  the  listed  companies  are  family-controlled,  while  the
omain  of  a  bank  is  present  in  around  the  12.09%.  These  per-
entages  are  consistent  with  previous  studies  focused  on  the
panish  context  (e.g., Santana  and  Aguiar,  2006;  Sacristán
nd  Gómez,  2007;  Bona  et  al.,  2011a;  Ruiz  and  Santana,
011).  On  average,  family  ﬁrms  are  controlled  by  the  same
amily  for  91%  of  the  10  years  analyzed  (100%  in  terms  of
edian)  and  96.3%  of  those  ﬁrms  have  family  members  on
he  board.  When  the  controlling  shareholder  is  a  bank,  this
ank  remains  in  control  for  67.6%  of  the  years  analyzed
70.7%  in  terms  of  median)  and  90.32%  of  this  controlling
hareholder  has  representation  on  the  board  of  directors.
oreover,  in  79.92%  of  the  companies,  the  control  of  the
ominant  owner  is  exercised  through  a  pyramid  structure.
hese  results  are  consistent  with  those  obtained  for  the
panish  context  by  Santana  and  Aguiar  (2006),  Sacristán
nd  Gómez  (2007),  Bona  et  al.  (2011a,b)  and  Ruiz  and
antana  (2009,  2011).  Finally,  regarding  the  presence  of
olitical  connections,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  dom-
nant  owner  and  the  use  of  pyramid  structures,  the  results
how  that  63.64%  of  the  companies  controlled  by  a  bank  have
t  least  one  political  director.  This  percentage  is  reduced  to
1.39%  for  family  ﬁrms,  while  approximately  50%  of  pyrami-
al  structures  have  at  least  one  political  connection  on  the
oard  of  directors.
The  descriptive  analysis  completed  in  Table  3  reports
he  correlations  among  the  variables  and  suggests  that
ulticollinearity  does  not  affect  subsequent  estimations.
evertheless,  we  conduct  a  formal  test  to  ensure  that  multi-
ollinearity  is  not  a  problem.  In  particular,  we  calculate  the
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Table  1  Politically  connected  ﬁrms  in  the  Spanish  stock  market.
2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012
Presence  of  political  directors  (%)
Politically  connected  ﬁrmsa 51.19  50.57  55.43  54.00  55.36  53.57  54.63  57.69  56.44  52.53
Politically connected  ﬁrms  (only
high-level  politicians)b
48.81  47.13  48.91  45.00  45.54  44.64  42.59  44.23  46.53  47.47
Types of  political  directors  (%)
Independents  65  66.1  65.6  65.1  69.6  70.4  73.1  75  75.8  75.4
Signiﬁcant shareholder
representatives
21.7  20.4  22.9  22.2  18.8  19.8  19.5  17.6  16.6  14.8
Executives 13.3  13.5  11.5  12.7  11.6  9.8  7.4  7.4  7.6  9.8
Characteristics  of  political  directors
Tenure  of  political  director  (years)  5.63  6.15  5.81  6.05  5.71  6.15  6.18  6.32  6.93  7.45
Ownership of  political  directors  (%)  0.24  0.15  0.28  0.31  0.20  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.26
Politically connected  ﬁrms  and  regulated  industries  (%  of  ﬁrms)
Regulated  industriesc 62.50  60.00  61.54  58.06  62.16  62.16  62.86  64.71  63.64  54.84
Non-regulated  industries 46.67  46.77  53.03  52.17  52.00  49.33  50.68  54.29  52.94  51.47
Politically connected  ﬁrms  and  industry  (%  of  ﬁrms)
Oil and  energy  87.5  75  87.5  100  72.7  72.7  90  100  100  100
Consumer goods  45  45  45  45  40.9  36.4  33.3  35  30.7  28.6
Consumer services  62.5  62.5  62.5  55.6  63.6  63.6  63.6  63.6  63.6  45.4
Basic materials,  Industry  and
Construction
48.3  48.3  51.7  53.3  54.8  51.6  53.1  60  62.1  62.1
Real Estate  Agencies  37.5  44.4  40  35.7  53.3  53.3  42.8  42.8  42.8  36.4
Transport and  telecoms  45.4  46.1  64.7  57.9  59.1  59.1  65  65  65  57.8
Number of  ﬁrms  84  87  92  100  112  112  108  104  101  99
a Politicians with European, Spanish, regional or local level.
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and  the  consideration  of  the  endogeneity  of  the  variables
by  estimating  a  Probit  model  with  instrumental  variables.
In  this  sense,  exogeneity  tests  show  a  more  adequatePoliticians with European or Spanish level.
c Regulated industries: energy, real estate agencies, transport a
ariance  Inﬂation  Factor  (VIF)  for  each  independent  vari-
ble  included  in  the  estimated  model.  The  results  show  that
he  highest  VIF  value  is  4.75,  and  the  average  is  1.41  and
.30  for  the  study  of  the  variables  POLITICIANS  and  Q.TOBIN,
espectively.  The  highest  VIF  ratio  is  well  below  5,  with  the
hreshold  value  indicating  that  multicollinearity  might  be  a
roblem  (Studenmund,  1997).  We  therefore  conclude  that
ulticollinearity  is  not  a  problem  in  our  sample.
olitical  directors  and  the  dominant  owner
o  test  Hypothesis  1,  we  have  performed  two  speciﬁca-
ions.  First,  we  have  estimated  a  Probit  multivariate  panel
odel  whose  dependent  variable  is  POLITICIANS, deﬁned  as
 dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1 when  at  least
ne  of  a  company’s  directors  has  held  a  political  position  at
he  European,  Spanish,  regional  or  local  level;  otherwise,
he  value  is  zero.  Thus,  we  have  estimated  a  binary  choice
odel  whose  probability  should  be  between  0  and  1.  There-
ore,  the  probability  that  a  company  has  a  political  advisor
s  determined  by  the  following  distribution:
POLITICIANSit =  1  Pr(POLITICIANSit =  1)  =  F(x ′it ˛)
POLITICIANSit =  0  Pr(POLITICIANSit =  0)  =  1  −  F(x ′it ˛)
POLITICIANSit =  F(x ′it ˛)  +  uit a
vlecoms.
here  (x  ’ it ˛)  is  the  vector  of  parameters  to  estimate  and
it is  the  error  term.  Thus,  to  test  Hypothesis  1,  we  have
erformed  the  speciﬁcation  of  the  vector  of  parameter  and
he  error  term  of  the  initial  model  as  follows:
OLITICIANSit =  ˛0 +  ˛1VOTINGit +  ˛2SIZEit +  ˛3MTBit
+  ˛4DEBTit +  ˛5PRESI  DUALit +  ık +  j +  it
herefore,  the  variable  ık estimates  the  industry  effect
nd  the  variable  j estimates  the  year  effect,  both  through
ummy  variables.  Second,  we  have  speciﬁed  a  Probit  model
ith  instrumental  variables  to  solve  potential  endogeneity
roblems.  In  this  sense,  the  concentration  of  voting  rights
an  inﬂuence  the  presence  of  politicians  on  the  board,  but
t  is  also  possible  that  the  presence  of  politicians  leads  to  a
reater  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  dominant
wner.  In  this  model  we  consider  ownership  as  an  endoge-
ous  variable  that  is  estimated  using  a  set  of  instrumental
ariables  Zit uncorrelated  with  the  error  term.1
Table  4  shows  the  results  of  estimating  the  Probit  models1 In this case we used the inclusion of the company in the Ibex-35
nd the 12-month Euribor rate as instrumental variables, with both
ariables measured at the end of each of the years analyzed.
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics.
Average  Median  S.D.  Min.  Max.
Panel  A.  Continuous  variables
VOTING  32.08  25.08  21.12  0.82  91.30
Q.TOBIN 1.51  1.18  1.19  0.66  7.43
SIZE 13.89  13.66  1.87  10.42  18.35
MTB 3.24  1.74  13.75  0.91  24.03
DEBT 0.63  0.63  0.25  0.15  0.92
Panel B.  Dummy  variables  (%)
POLITICIANS  54.25
FAMILY 48.43
BANK 12.09
PYRAMID  79.92
POLITICIANS  Famya 51.39
POLITICIANS  Banka 63.64
POLITICIANS Pyramida 52.63
PRESI DUAL 71.67
VOTING is the voting rights in the hands of the dominant owner. Q.TOBIN is the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm to the book value of
its assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. MTB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. DEBT
is total debt divided by total assets. POLITICIANS is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the members of the
board of directors has held a political position at the European, Spanish, regional or local level in the past; otherwise, the value is zero.
FAMILY and BANK are dummy variables that take the value of one if the dominant owner is a family or a bank, respectively; otherwise,
the value is zero. PYRAMID is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when dominant owner control is exercised through a pyramidal
structure; otherwise, the value is zero. POLITICIANS Famy, POLITICIANS Bank and POLITICIANS Pyramid are dummy variables that take
the value of 1 if at least one of the board members has held a political position at the European, Spanish, regional or local level in
the past and the dominant owner is a family, a bank or control the ﬁrm through a pyramid, respectively; otherwise, the value is zero.
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(PRESI DUAL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the p
a Politicians with European, Spanish nacional, regional or local l
estimation  in  Probit  models  with  instrumental  variables,
with  the  exception  of  the  analysis  of  pyramidal  structures
(models  4  and  8).  Accordingly,  consistent  with  Hypothesis
1,  the  results  suggest  that  voting  rights  and  the  family
nature  of  the  dominant  owner  have  a  signiﬁcant  negative
inﬂuence  on  the  probability  that  the  board  has  at  least  one
political  director.  In  addition,  the  estimated  coefﬁcients
in  Model  6  indicate  that  participation  in  the  voting  rights
of  the  dominant  family  does  not  affect  the  likelihood  of
establishing  political  connections  on  the  board  of  directors;
i.e.,  the  negative  impact  of  family  control  on  the  prob-
ability  of  establishing  political  ties  through  the  presence
of  political  directors  is  independent  of  the  voting  rights  in
the  hands  of  the  dominant  family.2 Moreover,  the  estimates
indicate  that  the  banking  nature  of  dominant  owners  and
the  use  of  pyramidal  structures  do  not  signiﬁcantly  affect
the  likelihood  of  having  a  politically  connected  board.
Thus,  the  results  indicate  that  the  dominant  owner’s  level
of  voting  rights  and  some  qualitative  aspects  linked  to  family
control  inﬂuence  board  composition  and,  in  particular,  the
presence  of  political  directors.  Thus,  our  results  are  consis-
tent  with  previous  studies  that  show  dominant  owners  having
2 This is because although the coefﬁcients are statistically
signiﬁcant, the value of these coefﬁcients implies that the effect
of the voting rights in the hands of the dominant family is
zero. Therefore, the inﬂuence of family control on the likelihood
of the presence of political connection on the board would be
(if FAMILY = 1): −0.054 × VOTING − 1.142 × 1 + 0.054 × VOTING × 1 =
−1.142 + (−0.054 + 0.054) × VOTING = −1.142.
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eent of the board has an executive role and zero otherwise.
n  active  role  in  the  design  of  the  governance  system  and,  in
articular,  board  composition  (e.g., Yeh  and  Woidtke,  2005;
urnev  and  Kim,  2005;  Kim  et  al.,  2007;  Dahya  et  al.,  2008).
Regarding  the  control  variables,  the  results  are  as
xpected  when  we  consider  the  size  of  the  company  and
he  dual  role  of  president  of  the  board  and  chief  executive,
n  that  both  variables  positively  and  signiﬁcantly  affect  the
ikelihood  of  having  a  politically  connected  board.  However,
he  results  do  not  show  a  statistically  signiﬁcant  effect  of
ither  debt  or  investment  opportunities  on  propensity  to
ave  a  politically  connected  board.
olitical  directors  and  ﬁrm  value
he  test  of  the  hypothesis  related  to  the  effect  of  political
onnections  on  ﬁrm  value  has  been  performed  by  estima-
ing  regressions  using  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments
GMM).  The  GMM  procedure  allows  us  to  address  potential
ndogeneity  problems  by  using  the  right-hand-side  variables
n  the  model  lagged  as  instruments;  the  only  exceptions
re  the  year  and  industry  effects  variables,  which  are  con-
idered  exogenous.  The  original  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)
pproach  can  perform  poorly,  however,  if  the  autoregressive
arameters  or  the  ratio  of  the  variance  of  the  panel-level
ffect  to  the  variance  of  the  idiosyncratic  error  are  too
arge.  Drawing  on  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995),  Blundell  and
ond  (1998)  develop  a  system  GMM  estimator  that  addresses
hese  problems  by  expanding  the  instrument  list  to  include
nstruments  for  the  level  equation.  The  consistency  of  GMM
stimates  depends  on  both  an  absence  of  second-order
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erial  autocorrelation  in  the  residuals  and  on  the  validity
f  the  instruments.  To  check  for  potential  model  misspec-
ﬁcation,  we  use  the  Hansen  statistic  of  over-identifying
estrictions.  We  next  examine  the  m2 statistic  developed  by
rellano  and  Bond  (1991)  to  test  for  the  absence  of  second-
rder  serial  correlation  in  the  ﬁrst  difference  residual.
inally,  we  conduct  three  Wald  tests,  speciﬁcally,  a  Wald
est  of  the  joint  signiﬁcance  of  the  reported  coefﬁcients
z1),  a  Wald  test  of  the  joint  signiﬁcance  of  the  industry
ummies  (z2)  and  a Wald  test  of  the  joint  signiﬁcance  of
he  time  dummies  (z3).  Therefore,  the  speciﬁcation  of  the
nitial  model  used  to  test  Hypothesis  2  is  as  follows:
.TOBINit =  ˛0 +  ˛1POLITICIANSit +  ˛2SIZEit +  ˛3MTBit
+  ˛4DEBTit +  ˛5PRESIDUALit +  ık +  j +  it
Thus,  model  9  (Table  5) shows  the  presence  of  political
irectors  to  have  a  positive  and  signiﬁcant  effect  on  ﬁrm
alue,  which  is  consistent  with  Hypothesis  2a. Furthermore,
o  extend  the  analysis  of  the  effect  of  political  connections
n  ﬁrm  value  in  Models  10,  11  and  12,  we  analyze  the  effect
f  political  connections  on  ﬁrm  value  when  the  dominant
wner  is  a  family,  bank  or  control  is  exercised  through  a
yramid  structure,  respectively.  Thus,  the  results  are  consis-
ent  with  Hypothesis  2a  in  the  case  of  family  ﬁrms  and  when
ontrol  is  exercised  through  a  pyramid,  while  when  a  bank
s  the  dominant  owner,  the  political  connection  negatively
ffects  ﬁrm  value  as  Hypothesis  2b  predicts.  In  this  line,
e  estimate  the  effect  of  directors’  tenure  on  ﬁrm  value.
he  results  show  a  nonlinear  relationship  (+/−)  between
irectors’  tenure  and  ﬁrm  value  (model  13).  Finally,  we
ompleted  the  analysis  with  model  14,  which  estimates  the
ffect  of  ownership  in  the  hands  of  political  directors  on
rm  value.  The  results  show  a  nonlinear  relationship  (−/+)
etween  both  variables.
Regarding  the  control  variables,  the  results  indicate  that
rm  size  has  a  negative  impact  on  value,  which  is  consis-
ent  with  the  higher  agency  problems  associated  with  larger
ompanies.  However,  debt  level,  investment  opportunities
nd  the  dual  role  of  president  of  the  board  positively  affect
rm  value.
ensitivity  analysis
o  determine  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  ﬁrst  ana-
yze  the  likelihood  of  having  a  politically  connected  board
hrough  the  use  of  high-level  politicians.  Therefore,  we
eﬁne  the  variable  POLITICIANS  HIGH  as  a  dummy  variable
hat  takes  the  value  of  1  when  at  least  one  director  has  held
 political  position  at  the  European  or  Spanish  level  and  zero
therwise.  The  results  shown  in  Table  6  are  consistent  with
hose  obtained  when  we  analyzed  all  politicians.
Moreover,  regarding  the  study  of  the  effect  of  political
onnections  on  ﬁrm  value,  Table  7  shows  the  estimation
esults  when  the  analysis  focuses  on  high-level  politicians
model  23)  and  the  impact  of  political  directors  is  analyzed
n  terms  of  their  classiﬁcation  as  independent,  signiﬁcant
hareholder  representatives  or  executives  (models  24,  25
nd  26).  With  the  exception  of  banks  as  dominant  owners,
n  the  remaining  situations  the  results  show  that  political
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Table  4  Political  directors  and  dominant  owner.
Estimated
sign
Probit  multivariate  panel  models Probit  models  with  instrumental  variables
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
VOTING  −  −0.174**
(−2.00)
−0.048**
(−2.20)
−0.018**
(−2.03)
−0.010*
(−1.71)
−0.024**
(−2.43)
−0.054**
(−2.53)
−0.026**
(−2.41)
−0.023
(−0.27)
FAMILY − 0.323
(0.58)
−1.142**
(−2.53)
VOTING X  FAMILY −  0.033
(1.48)
0.054**
(2.50)
BANK −  −0.600
(−0.68)
−0.563
(−1.27)
VOTING  X  BANK −  −0.014
(−0.43)
0.016
(1.14)
PYRAMID  −  0.343
(0.57)
0.020
(0.1)
VOTING X  PYRAMID −  −0.007
(−0.27)
−0.021
(−0.25)
SIZE +  0.821***
(4.59)
1.408***
(5.28)
0.8445***
(4.51)
1.311***
(5.18)
0.226***
(6.62)
0.244***
(7.4)
0.226***
(6.31)
0.243***
(7.43)
MTB +  0.0002
(0.04)
0.060
(0.48)
0.001
(0.24)
0.076
(0.64)
0.004
(1.05)
0.004
(1.24)
0.004
(1.13)
0.004
(1.01)
DEBT  +  0.966**
(2.41)
−0.103
(−0.09)
0.991**
(2.47)
0.168
(0.14)
0.020
(0.10)
0.238
(1.34)
0.007
(0.4)
0.226
(1.05)
PRESI DUAL +  1.639***
(4.64)
1.855 ***
(4.52)
1.594***
(4.33)
1.772***
(4.54)
0.361**
(2.48)
0.295*
(1.77)
0.326**
(2.02)
0.525***
(4.77)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year  effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant  −12.623***
(−5.34)
−19.687***
(−5.98)
−12.991***
(−5.35)
−18.498***
(−5.72)
−2.695***
(−4.23)
−2.305***
(−3.01)
−2.607***
(−3.68)
−3.647**
(−2.29)
Long pseudo--likelihood −292.987 −243.410  −291.763  −249.722  −492.75  418.55  490.71  403.15
Wald 2 86.42*** 83.58*** 86.78*** 87.89*** 291.23*** 278.36*** 308.74*** 240.42***
Test  rho  =  0  501.58*** 428.85*** 507.65*** 407.67***
Test  Wald  of  exogeneity 3.56* 3.07* 3.39* 0.14
Dependent variable: POLITICIANS is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the members of the board of directors has held a political position at the European,
Spanish, regional or local level in the past; otherwise, the value is zero. VOTING is the voting rights in the hands of the dominant owner. FAMILY and BANK are dummy variables that take
the value of one if the dominant owner is a family or a bank, respectively; otherwise, the value is zero. PYRAMID is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when dominant owner
control is exercised through a pyramidal structure; otherwise, the value is zero. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. MTB  is the market value of equity divided by the book
value of equity. DEBT is total debt divided by total assets. PRESI DUAL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the president of the board has an executive role and zero otherwise.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table  5  Political  connections  and  ﬁrm  value.
Estimated
sign
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
POLITICIANS +/− 0.177***
(7.64)
0.139***
(2.65)
0.185***
(5.43)
0.312***
(3.15)
FAMILY +/− 0.155***
(3.89)
POLITICIANS Famy +/− 0.081*
(1.75)
BANK +/− −0.121***
(−2.62)
POLITICIANS Bank +/− −0.167***
(−3.56)
PYRAMID +/− 0.046
(0.55)
POLITICIANS Pyramid +/− 0.268**
(2.21)
POLITICIANS TENURE +/− 0.022***
(11.56)
POLITICIANS TENURE2 +/− −0.001***
(−12.19)
POLITICIANS OWN +/− −0.063***
(−9.23)
POLITICIANS OWN2 +/− 0.005***
(10.22)
SIZE  − −0.047***
(−7.29)
−0.079***
(−5.78)
−0022**
(−2.19)
−0.222***
(−11.59)
−0.046***
(−6.88)
−0.028***
(−8.43)
DEBT  + 0.323***
(6.67)
0.55***
(6.65)
0.137*
(1.79)
0.260***
(11.41)
0.176**
(2.21)
0.158***
(3.78)
MTB  + 0.009***
(16.08)
0.001***
(8.31)
0.001***
(9.69)
0.019***
(16.75)
0.009***
(8.41)
0.002**
(2.57)
PRESI  DUAL +/− 0.154***
(9.84)
0.049
(1.14)
0.115***
(6.05)
0.358***
(4.48)
0.0786***
(4.89)
0.171***
(14.38)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year  effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.916***
(7.94)
1.239***
(6.42)
1.50***
(7.92)
1.624***
(7.43)
1.204***
(10.32)
0.898***
(9.36)
F  1712.65*** 3156*** 2766.36*** 210.58*** 802.11*** 1050.4***
M2 0.60 0.31 0.11 0.23 0.66 0.30
Z1 162.90*** 189.17*** 35.38*** 169.78*** 53.14*** 104.58***
Z2 77.06*** 154.95*** 59.45*** 25.84*** 66.46*** 44.41***
Z3 260.24*** 168.15*** 101.75*** 45.02*** 327.58*** 154.01***
Hansen test 101.01 (103) 87.76 (140) 96.71 (178) 64.29 (62) 89.62 (125) 97.67 (124)
Dependent variable: Q.TOBIN, is the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm to the book value of its assets. POLITICIANS, is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the members of the board of directors has held a political position at the European,
Spanish, regional or local level in the past; otherwise, the value is zero. FAMILY and BANK are dummy variables that take the value of
one if the dominant owner is a family or a bank, respectively; otherwise, the value is zero. PYRAMID, is a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 when dominant owner control is exercised through a pyramidal structure; otherwise, the value is zero. POLITICIANS Famy,
POLITICIANS Bank and POLITICIANS Pyramid are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if at least one of the board members has
held a political position at the European, Spanish, regional or local level in the past and the dominant owner is a family, a bank or
control the ﬁrm through a pyramid, respectively; otherwise, the value is zero. POLITICIANS TENURE, is the average tenure of political
directors as board members. POLITICIANS OWN, is the percentage of voting rights held by political directors. VOTING, is the voting rights
in the hands of the dominant owner. SIZE, is the natural logarithm of the total assets. DEBT, is total debt divided by total assets. MTB,
is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. PRESI DUAL, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
president of the board has an executive role and zero otherwise. Hansen, test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis
that all instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance process. m2, statistic test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the
ﬁrst-difference residual. z1, Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the reported coefﬁcients. z2, Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the
industries dummies. z3, Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the time dummies. In parentheses, t-statistics based on robust standard
errors.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table  6  Political  connections  and  dominant  owner  (sensitivity  analysis).
Robit  multivariate  panel  models Probit  models  with  instrumental  variables
(15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)
VOTING  −0.018**
(−2.23)
−0.049***
(−2.60)
−0.017**
(−1.97)
−0.021*
(−1.76)
−0.024***
(−2.68)
−0.056***
(−2.85)
−0.027***
(−2.68)
−0.081
(−0.78)
FAMILY −0.076
(−0.15)
−1.305***
(−3.22)
VOTING X  FAMILY 0.034*
(1.72)
0.056***
(2.82)
BANK 0.177
(0.21)
−0.405
(−0.92)
VOTING  X  BANK −0.034
(−1.06)
0.017
(1.24)
PYRAMID  0.072
(0.14)
−1.66
(−0.95)
VOTING X  PYRAMID 0.003
(0.13)
0.081
(0.76)
SIZE  0.825***
(4.87)
0.853***
(4.91)
0.828***
(4.80)
0.823***
(4.85)
0.225***
(6.54)
0.234***
(7.14)
0.218***
(6.12)
0.136***
(5.70)
MTB −0.0008
(−0.19)
0.0001
(0.03)
0.00005
(0.01)
−0.0008
(−0.18)
0.004
(1.11)
0.005
(1.25)
0.004
(1.10)
0.004
(0.85)
DEBT  1.318**
(2.51)
1.367***
(2.56)
1.344**
(2.54)
1.330**
(2.52)
0.187
(0.94)
0.451***
(2.65)
0.195
(0.99)
0.172
(0.35)
PRESI DUAL 0.707**
(2.29)
0.649 **
(2.03)
0.621*
(1.94)
0.716**
(2.31)
0.294**
(2.13)
0.211
(1.35)
0.269*
(1.76)
0.225
(0.46)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year  effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant  −13.191***
(−5.69)
−13.567***
(−5.61)
−13.286***
(−5.68)
−13.246***
(−5.58)
−2.664***
(−4.17)
−2.202***
(−2.71)
−2.497***
(−3.56)
−0.602
(−0.12)
Long pseudo-likelihood −292.073 −287.722 −289.851 −292.014 494.39  420.13  492.26  405.19
Wald 2 85.24*** 85.54*** 87.61*** 85.49*** 278.27*** 289.64*** 297.67*** 395.86***
Test  rho  =  0 540.82*** 545.30*** 543.11*** 536.41***
Test  Wald  of  exogeneity 4.10** 4.27** 4.06** 0.27
Dependent variable: POLITICIANS HIGH is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the members of the board of directors has held a political position at the European
or Spanish level in the past; otherwise, the value is zero. VOTING is the voting rights in the hands of the dominant owner. FAMILY and BANK are dummy variables that take the value of one
if the dominant owner is a family or a bank, respectively; otherwise, the value is zero. PYRAMID is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when dominant owner control is exercised
through a pyramidal structure; otherwise, the value is zero. SIZE, is the natural logarithm of the total assets. MTB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. DEBT
is total debt divided by total assets. PRESI DUAL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the president of the board has an executive role and zero otherwise.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table  7  Political  connections  and  ﬁrm  value  (sensitivity  analysis).
(23)  (24)  (25)  (26)  (27)  (28)  (29)
POLITICIANS  HIGH  0.309***
(17.20)
0.178***
(3.75)
0.175***
(6.08)
0.272***
(3.91)
FAMILY  0.081**
(2.14)
POLÍTICIANS  HIGH  Famy  0.103***
(2.86)
BANK  −0.215***
(−2.64)
POLITICIANS HIGH  Bank −0.284***
(−3.77)
PYRAMID  0.025
(0.28)
POLITICIANS  HIGH  Pyramid  0.450***
(5.14)
POLITICIANS INDP 0.057***
(3.21)
POLITICIANS DOMI 0.200***
(4.42)
POLITICIANS EXC 0.233***
(3.06)
SIZE −0.062 ***
(−9.75)
−0.094***
(−6.00)
−0.075***
(−9.61)
−0.193***
(−10.04)
−0.027***
(−5.43)
−0.045***
(−8.23)
0.003
(0.20)
DEBT 0.291***
(5.97)
0.634***
(8.74)
0.371***
(5.32)
0.172***
(11.95)
0.300***
(7.20)
0.179***
(3.63)
0.290***
(4.41)
MTB 0.007***
(13.47)
0.001***
(12.08)
0.003***
(11.29)
0.019***
(19.92)
0.007***
(13.64)
0.008***
(13.64)
0.010***
(3.35)
PRESI DUAL  0.149***
(7.30)
0.003***
(0.1)
0.240***
(8.38)
0.351***
(5.33)
0.150***
(7.88)
0.218***
(12.58)
0.142***
(5.18)
Industry effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Constant 1.038***
(9.51)
1.504***
(6.56)
1.359***
(6.35)
1.184***
(5.85)
0.792***
(8.02)
1.072***
(9.26)
21.970***
(7.59)
F 1013.70*** 6931.56*** 6835.39*** 407.76*** 3701.08*** 2219.91*** 338.82***
M2 0.67  0.57  0.11  0.02  0.62  0.46  3.87
Z1 143.65*** 186.62*** 49.38*** 222.66*** 67.97*** 152.21*** 15.17***
Z2 102.31*** 57.42*** 178.77*** 18.1*** 113.95*** 40.26*** 74.53***
Z3 412.07*** 291.84*** 192.93*** 43.98*** 676.04*** 286.35*** 153.15***
Hansen  test  96.90  (103)  96.53  (153)  94.02  (119)  60.58  (64)  100.93  (103)  91.14  (98)  67.82  (71)
Dependent variable: Q.TOBIN, is the ratio of the market value of the ﬁrm to the book value of its assets. POLITICIANS HIGH, is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if at least one of the members of the board of directors has held a political position at the European
or Spanish level in the past; otherwise, the value is zero. FAMILY and BANK are dummy variables that take the value of one if the
dominant owner is a family or a bank, respectively; otherwise, the value is zero. PYRAMID, is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 when dominant owner control is exercised through a pyramidal structure; otherwise, the value is zero. POLITICIANS HIGH Famy,
POLITICIANS HIGH Bank and POLITICIANS HIGH Pyramid are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if at least one of the board members
has held a political position at the European or Spanish level in the past and the dominant owner is a family, a bank or control the ﬁrm
through a pyramid, respectively; otherwise, the value is zero. POLITICIANS INDP, POLITICIANS DOMI and POLITICIANS EXC are dummy
variables that take the value of 1 if at least one of the board members has held a political position at the European, Spanish or local
level in the past and this director is independent, signiﬁcant shareholder representatives or executives, respectively; otherwise, the
value is zero. SIZE, is the natural logarithm of the total assets. DEBT, is total debt divided by total assets. MTB, is the market value of
equity divided by the book value of equity. PRESI DUAL, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the president of the board has
an executive role and zero otherwise. Hansen, test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that all instruments are
uncorrelated with the disturbance process. m2, statistic test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-difference residual.
z1, Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the reported coefﬁcients. z2, Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the industries dummies. z3,
Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of the time dummies. In parentheses, t-statistics based on robust standard errors.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.
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fPolitically  connected  ﬁrms  in  Spain  
connections  have  a  positive  and  signiﬁcant  effect  on  ﬁrm
value.
Summary and  conclusion
In  this  paper,  we  have  analyzed  the  relationship  between
dominant  owners’  control  and  the  presence  of  a  politically
connected  board,  as  well  as  the  impact  of  a  politically
connected  board  on  ﬁrm  value,  in  a  sample  of  Spanish  listed
companies  over  the  period  2003--2012.  The  results  show
that  about  half  of  the  listed  companies  have  a  politically
connected  board.  Furthermore,  the  results  show  that  most
of  the  political  directors  are  independent,  have  an  average
tenure  of  six  years  and  have  an  approximately  0.2%  share
in  the  company’s  voting  rights.  These  results  place  Spain  in
between  US  and  Asian  companies.  The  studies  of  Agrawal
and  Knoeber  (2001)  and  Goldman  et  al.  (2009)  show  that
30%  of  US  ﬁrms  have  politically  connected  boards,  and  Qian
et  al.  (2011)  and  Firth  et  al.  (2012)  show  that  in  China
and  Shangai,  respectively,  the  percentage  of  politically
connected  ﬁrms  is  80%.
Furthermore,  the  results  show  that  voting  rights  and  the
family  nature  of  the  dominant  owner  have  a  negative  impact
on  the  probability  of  having  a  politician  on  the  board.  Thus,
the  results  obtained  reveal  that  political  connections  may
determine  the  structure  of  corporate  governance  and,  in
particular,  the  composition  of  the  board  of  directors.  In
this  sense,  the  results  are  in  line  with  those  obtained  by
Yeh  and  Woidtke  (2005),  Durnev  and  Kim  (2005),  Kim  et  al.
(2007)  and  Dahya  et  al.  (2008)  and  show  the  importance  of
the  dominant  shareholder’s  ability  to  inﬂuence  the  compo-
sition  of  the  board.  Our  study  suggests  that  concentration  of
ownership  and  control  stability  facilitate  the  establishment
of  relationships  and  private  channels  between  the  domi-
nant  owner  and  political  elites  (Chen  et  al.,  2011),  which
may  reduce  the  need  for  a  director  with  a  ‘‘political  role’’
because  this  role  can  be  assumed  by  the  dominant  owner.
Additionally,  the  results  show  that  family  control’s  nega-
tive  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  having  a  politically  connected
board  is  independent  of  the  voting  rights  of  the  dominant
family.  This  result  may  reﬂect  the  importance  of  the  qual-
itative  aspects  related  to  family  control.  Therefore,  the
family  long-term  commitment,  the  stability  in  control  or  the
importance  of  the  family  reputation  (Anderson  and  Reeb,
2003)  seem  to  have  a  greater  inﬂuence  on  board  composi-
tion  than  the  concentration  of  ownership  in  the  hands  of  the
controlling  family.  Thus,  in  line  with  the  arguments  of  Morck
(2009),  the  results  seem  to  indicate  that  family  control,
regardless  of  ownership  stake,  has  the  social  status  and
political  inﬂuence  necessary  to  obtain  political  rents  with-
out  establishing  explicit  political  connections  on  the  board,
thereby  avoiding  greater  scrutiny  (e.g., Riahi-Belkaoui,
2004;  Chaney  et  al.,  2011;  Boubakri  et  al.,  2012).
Regarding  the  impact  of  political  connections  on  ﬁrm
value,  the  results  obtained  show  the  presence  of  political
directors  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  ﬁrm  value,  irrespective
of  the  political  level  of  the  director  and  the  type  of  director
(independent,  signiﬁcant  shareholder  representative  or
executive).  Moreover,  this  positive  effect  is  shown  when
we  analyze  the  presence  of  political  connections  in  family
controlled  ﬁrms  and  when  the  control  is  exercised  through
a  pyramid  structure.  In  this  sense,  the  positive  impact  of
ﬁ
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olitical  connections  on  ﬁrm  value  can  reﬂect  that  polit-
cal  directors  create  value  through  their  knowledge  and
nﬂuence  on  the  development  of  laws  that  affect  company
erformance  or  through  the  achievement  of  favours  that
eneﬁt  the  company,  and  these  advantages  are  expanded
hrough  pyramidal  structures  (e.g.,  Agrawal  and  Knoeber,
001;  Fisman,  2001;  Faccio,  2006;  Goldman  et  al.,  2009;
oubakri  et  al.,  2012;  Duchin  and  Sosyura,  2012).  Besides,
he  positive  impact  of  political  connections  on  ﬁrm  value
an  be  associated  with  such  connections  increasing  social
nd  media  scrutiny  and  creating  a  growing  concern  for
he  reputation  of  the  dominant  owners  and  the  political
irectors  (e.g., Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  2001;  Stafsudd,  2009).
owever,  the  results  indicate  that  the  presence  of  political
irectors  in  companies  controlled  by  banks  has  a negative
ffect  on  ﬁrm  value.  This  result  may  reﬂect  behaviour  con-
rary  to  ﬁrm  value  maximization  when  the  company  jointly
ncorporates  the  advantages  of  political  connections  with
n  eased  access  to  bank  ﬁnancing  and  reduced  discipline
rom  the  capital  market  (Qian  et  al.,  2011).
Our  study  reveals  a  U-shaped  reverse  relationship
+/−)  between  tenure  and  ﬁrm  value.  That  is,  the  ﬁrm
alue-tenure  relationship  has  a  tendency  to  grow  until  a
ertain  point,  at  which  the  relationship  becomes  negative.
his  result  may  reﬂect  that  the  advantages  linked  to  the
ole  of  political  directors  that  positively  impact  ﬁrm  value
ill  deteriorate  over  time,  possibly  resulting  in  the  director
osing  power  or  inﬂuence  in  the  political  arena.  In  this  sense,
he  estimation  obtained  indicates  that  the  positive  relation-
hip  holds  during  a  11-year  tenure.  Considering  the  average
olitical  director  tenure  in  our  sample  (six  years),  we  can
onclude  that  most  of  the  Spanish  listed  companies  are  on
he  positive  end  of  the  tenure-ﬁrm  value  relationship.  Fur-
hermore,  the  results  indicate  a  nonlinear  U-shaped  effect
−/+)  of  ownership  in  the  hands  of  political  directors  on  ﬁrm
alue.  This  result  shows  that  the  effect  of  ownership  in  the
ands  of  the  political  directors  is  negative  up  to  a  certain
oint,  from  which  the  relationship  is  positive.  This  result
ay  reveal  that  the  market  expects  that  when  a  politician
ssumes  lower  costs  of  expropriation  activities,  he/she  is
ore  likely  to  perform  these  expropriation  practices  until
is/her  ownership  stake  reaches  a  certain  threshold,  at
hich  point  the  market  expects  political  directors  to  have
reater  incentives  for  adopting  value-maximizing  behaviour.
hus,  the  results  obtained  indicate  a  negative  relationship
ntil  ownership  stake  reaches  6.3%,  from  which  point  the
elationship  begins  to  be  positive.  The  average  ownership
take  for  this  type  of  board  member  is  0.2%,  so  we  can
onclude  that  the  majority  of  Spanish  listed  companies  are
n  the  decreasing  side  of  the  relationship  between  voting
n  the  hands  of  the  political  directors  and  ﬁrm  value.
Our  research  provides  evidence  for  regulators  and  eco-
omic  agents  of  the  need  for  greater  transparency  in  the
elationship  between  business  ‘‘oligarchs’’  and  political
lites.  In  a  context  where  the  main  role  of  the  board  of
irectors  would  be  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders’
nterests,  the  results  obtained  in  this  study  point  to  the  need
or  greater  transparency  about  the  role  and  professional  pro-
le  of  all  directors,  beyond  the  role  of  executives,  signiﬁcant
hareholders’  representatives  or  independent  directors.
This  study  does  have  some  limitations,  mainly  related  to
he  difﬁculty  of  measuring  the  existence  of  political  connec-
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ions.  We  focused  on  one  type  of  political  connection,  but
here  may  be  other  nexuses  between  political  and  business
lites  not  captured  in  the  current  study;  for  example,  those
erived  from  family  or  corporate  links.
Finally,  this  work  opens  up  opportunities  for  future
esearch  on  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between
olitical  connections  and  ﬁrm  behaviour.  Thus,  the  results
ndicate  the  need  to  further  explore  the  relationship
etween  political  connections  and  family  control  or  the
ncidence  of  political  ties  in  corporate  decisions.
cknowledgements
he  authors  gratefully  acknowledge  the  helpful  comments
nd  suggestions  received  from  the  referees  and  from  the
ssociate  Editor,  Susana  Menéndez.  We  also  thank  the
esearch  Agency  of  the  Spanish  Government  for  ﬁnancial
upport  (Project  ECO2011-29144-CO3-02).
eferences
grawal, A., Knoeber, C.R., 2001. Do some outside directors play a
political role? J. Law Econ. 44, 179--198.
moako-Adu, B., Smith, B.F., 2001. Dual class ﬁrms: capitalization,
ownership structure and recapitalization back into single class.
J. Bank. Finance 25, 1083--1111.
nderson, R.C., Reeb, D.M., 2003. Founding-family ownership and
ﬁrm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. J. Finance 58,
1301--1327.
rellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of speciﬁcation for panel
data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment
equations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 58, 277--297.
rellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental vari-
able estimation of error-components models. J. Econom. 68,
29--51.
eck, T., Levine, R., Loayza, N., 2000. Finance and the sources of
growth. J. Financ. Econ. 58, 234--300.
ona Sánchez, C., Pérez Alemán, J., Santana Martín, D.J., 2011a.
Defence measures and earnings management in an owner dom-
inant context. J. Bus. Finance Account. 38, 785--793.
ona Sánchez, C., Pérez Alemán, J., Santana Martín, D.J., 2011b.
Ultimate ownership and earnings conservatism. Eur. Account.
Rev. 20, 57--80.
ona Sánchez, C., Pérez Alemán, J., Santana Martín, D.J., 2014.
Politically connected ﬁrms and earnings informativeness in the
controlling versus minority shareholders context: European evi-
dence. Corp. Gov.: Int. Rev. 22, 330--346.
oubakri, N., Cosset, J.-C., Saffar, W.,  2008. Political connections
of newly privatized ﬁrms. J. Corp. Finance 14, 654--673.
oubakri, N., Guedhami, O., Mishra, D., Saffar, W., 2012. Political
connections and the cost of equity capital. J. Corp. Finance 18,
541--559.
lundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restric-
tions in dynamic panel data models. J. Econom. 87, 115--143.
urkart, M., Panunzi, F., Shleifer, A., 2003. Family ﬁrms. J. Finance
58, 2167--2201.
haney, P.K., Faccio, M., Parsley, D., 2011. The quality of accounting
information in politically connected ﬁrms. J. Account. Econ. 51,
58--76.
hen, C.J.P., Li, Z., Zu, X., Sun, Z., 2011. Rent-seeking incentives,
corporate political connections, and the control structure of
private ﬁrms: Chinese evidence. J. Corp. Finance 17, 229--243.
ho, M.-H., 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corpo-
rate value: an empirical analysis. J. Financ. Econ. 47, 103--121.
LS.  Guerra  Pérez  et  al.
laessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L., 2000. The separation of owner-
ship and control in East Asian corporations. J. Financ. Econ. 58,
81--112.
laessens, S., Djankow, S., Fan, J., Lang, L., 2002. Disentangling
the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings.
J. Finance 57, 2741--2771.
NMV, 2006. Código Uniﬁcado de Buen Gobierno de las Sociedades
Cotizadas. CNMV, Madrid.
ooper, M.J., Gulen, H., Ovtchinnikov, A.V., 2010. Corporate polit-
ical contributions and stock returns. J. Finance 65, 687--724.
uervo, A., 1991. Los grupos empresariales bancarios. Pap. Econ.
Esp. 49, 237--245.
uervo, A., 2002. Corporate governance mechanisms: a plea for less
code of good governance and more market control. Corp. Gov.:
Int. Rev. 10, 84--93.
ahya, J., Dimitrov, O., McConnell, J.J., 2008. Dominant sharehol-
ders, corporate boards, and corporate value: a cross-country
analysis. J. Financ. Econ. 87, 73--100.
aines, R., Klausner, M., 2001. Do IPO charters maximize ﬁrm value?
Antitakeover protection in IPOs. J. Law Econ. Organ. 17, 83--120.
emsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership structure and corpo-
rate performance. J. Corp. Finance 7, 209--233.
urnev, A., Kim, E.H., 2005. To steal or not to steal: ﬁrm attributes,
legal environment, and valuation. J. Finance 60, 1461--1493.
uchin, R., Sosyura, D., 2012. The politics of government invest-
ment. J. Financ. Econ. 106, 24--48.
accio, M., 2006. Politically-connected ﬁrms. Am. Econ. Rev. 96,
369--386.
accio, M., 2010. Differences between politically connected and
no connected ﬁrms: a cross-country analysis. Financ. Manag.
Autumn 39, 905--927.
accio, M., Masulis, R.W., McConnell, J.J., 2006. Political connec-
tions and corporate bailouts. J. Finance 61, 2597--2635.
accio, M., Lang, L., 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western Euro-
pean corporations. J. Financ. Econ. 65, 365--395.
accio, M., Parsley, D.C., 2009. Sudden deaths: taking stock of geo-
graphic ties. J. Financ. Quant. Anal. 44, 683--718.
ernández, Z., 2001. Las relaciones Banca- Industria: Un tiempo
para la revisión. Econ. Ind. 341, 13--24.
erreira, M.A., Matos, P., 2008. The colors of investors’ money: the
role of institutional investors around the world. J. Financ. Econ.
88, 499--533.
irth, M., Malatesta, P.H., Xin, Q., Xu, L., 2012. Corporate
investment, government control, and ﬁnancing channels: evi-
dence from China’s listed companies. J. Corp. Finance 18,
433--450.
isman, R., 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. Am.
Econ. Rev. 91, 1095--1102.
oldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J., 2009. Do politically connected
boards affect ﬁrm value? Rev. Financ. Stud. 22, 2331--2360.
adi, A., 1994. A modiﬁcation of a method for the detection of
outliers in multivariate samples. J. R. Stat. Soc. 56, 393--396.
ermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 1988. The determinants of board
composition. RAND J. Econ. 19, 589--606.
hanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000. Is group afﬁliation proﬁtable in emerg-
ing markets? An analysis of diversiﬁed Indian business groups. J.
Finance 55, 867--891.
hwaja, A.I., Mian, A., 2005. Do lenders favor politically connected
ﬁrms? Rent seeking in an emerging ﬁnancial market. Q. J. Econ.
120, 1371--1411.
im, K.A., Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, P., Nofsinger, J.R., 2007.
Large shareholders, board independence, and minority sharehol-
ders right: evidence from Europe. J. Corp. Finance 13, 859--880.
ing, M.R., Santor, E., 2008. Family values: ownership structure,
performance and capital structure of Canadian ﬁrms. J. Bank.
Finance 32, 2423--2432.
a Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law
and ﬁnance. J. Pol. Econ. 106, 1113--1155.
RR
R
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
V
Y
29, 1857--1885.Politically  connected  ﬁrms  in  Spain  
La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate
ownership around the world. J. Finance 54, 471--517.
La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000.
Investor protection and corporate governance. J. Finance 58,
3--27.
Leuz, Ch., Oberholzer-Gee, F., 2006. Political relationships, global
ﬁnancing, and corporate transparency: evidence from Indonesia.
J. Financ. Econ. 81, 411--439.
Li, H., Meng, L., Qian, W.,  Zhou, L., 2008. Political connections,
ﬁnancing and ﬁrm performance: evidence from Chinese private
ﬁrms. J. Dev. Econ. 87, 283--299.
López, F.J., Rodríguez, J.A., 2001. Ownership structure, corporate
value and ﬁrm investment: a simultaneous equations analysis of
Spanish companies. J. Manag. Gov. 5, 179--204.
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity
ownership and corporate value. J. Financ. Econ. 27, 595--612.
Morck, R., 2009. The riddle of great pyramids. National Bureau of
Economics Research, WP: 14858.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1988. Management ownership
and market valuation: an empirical analysis. J. Financ. Econ. 20,
293--315.
Morck, R., Stangeland, D.A., Yeung, B., 2000. Inherited wealth, cor-
porate control and economic growth: The Canadian Disease. In:
Morck, R. (Ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership. University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Morck, R., Yeung, B., 2004. Family control and the rent-seeking
society. Entrepreneurship Theor. Pract. 28, 391--409.
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., Yeung, B., 2004. Corporate governance
economic entrenchment and growth. National Bureau of Eco-
nomics Research, WP: 10692.
Pindado, J., Requejo, I., de la Torre, Ch., 2012. Do family ﬁrms use
dividend policy as a governance mechanism? Evidence from the
Euro zone. Corp. Gov.: Int. Rev. 20, 413--431.
Qian, M., Pan, H., Yeung, B., 2011. Expropriation of minority share-
holders in politically connected ﬁrms. SSRN, WP: 1719335.
Rajan, R., Zingales, L., 2003. Protecting Capitalism from the
Capitalists----Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create
Wealth and Spread Opportunity. Crown, New York, NY.
Z245
iahi-Belkaoui, A., 2004. Politically-connected ﬁrms: are they con-
nected to earnings opacity? Res. Account. Regul. 17, 25--38.
uiz-Mallorquí, M.V., Santana Martín, D.J., 2009. Ultimate institu-
tional owner and takeover defenses in the controlling versus
minority shareholders context. Corp. Gov.: Int. Rev. 17, 238--254.
uiz-Mallorquí, M.V., Santana Martín, D.J., 2011. Dominant institu-
tional owners and ﬁrm value. J. Bank. Fin. 35, 118--129.
acristán-Navarro, M., Gómez-Ansón, S., 2007. Family ownership
and pyramids in the Spanish market. Fam. Bus. Rev. 20, 247--265.
antana Martín, D.J., Aguiar-Díaz, I., 2006. El último propietario de
las empresas cotizadas espan˜olas. Cuad. Econ. Dir. Empres. 26,
47--72.
antana Martín, D.J., Aguiar-Díaz, I., Díaz Díaz, N.L., 2009. Último
propietario y medidas defensivas en Espan˜a. Rev. Esp. Financ.
Contab. 38, 399--422.
eifert, B., Gonence, H., Wright, J., 2005. The international
evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders,
blockholders, and institutions. J. Multinatl. Financ. Manag. 15,
171--191.
hleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J.
Finance 52, 737--784.
tafsudd, A., 2009. Corporate networks as informal governance
mechanisms: a small worlds approach to Sweden. Corp. Gov.:
Int. Rev. 17, 62--76.
teinherr, A., Huveneers, C.H., 1994. On the performance of differ-
ently regulated ﬁnancial institutions: some empirical evidence.
J. Bank. Finance 18, 271--306.
tudenmund, A.H., 1997. Using Econometrics: A Practical Approach.
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
illalonga, B., Amit, R., 2006. How do family ownership, control and
management affect ﬁrm value? J. Financ. Econ. 80, 385--417.
eh, Y.-H., Woidtke, T., 2005. Commitmen or entrenchment? Con-
trolling shareholders and board composition. J. Bank. Financeoido, M., 1998. Un estudio de las participaciones accionariales
de los bancos en las empresas espan˜olas. Investig. Econ. 22,
427--467.
